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Far from a common market: 
Exploring the surprising paucity of German 
care home providers in Austria
Kai Leichsenring
The common market and the new  
‘light regime for social services’ 
Long-term care (LTC) services and facilities are a specific part of what has 
been labelled ‘social services of general interest’ (ssgi) and ‘services of 
General Economic Interest’ (SGEI) in EU rules and regulations. While the 
regulation of the LTC sector as such remains under the responsibility of 
individual countries, Member States have also agreed upon ‘a set of com-
mon objectives centred on access for all to financially sustainable, high-
quality long-term care’ (European Commission, 2013a: 4) and, of course, 
to apply ‘the European Union rules on state aid, public procurement and 
the internal market’ (European Commission, 2013b: 5). These include 
in particular the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide 
services (Articles 49 and 56 TFEU), but also particular legal specifications 
that have emanated from case law,1
 
consultations of stakeholders and 
communications from the Commission (e.g. European Commission, 2010). 
Nevertheless, Member States remained with ‘a wide margin of discretion’ 
when it comes to defining the public service tasks they want to put in 
place as ‘the precise (…) services which form part of these tasks do not 
necessarily have to be specified’ (European Commission, 2010: 42).
The countless details regarding when public authorities support, procure, 
outsource, control or fund social services triggered ample critique from 
Member States, social service providers and within the Commission. 
as a result of ensuing consultations,2
 
a number of new regulations have 
contributed to determine ‘a light regime for social services’ in relation 
to State aid and public procurement of SSGI over the past few years (cf. 
European Commission, 2013b):
1 The most influential Court decision in this context was the ‘Altmark judgment’ (Case 
C-280/00 Altmark [2003] ECR I-7747), which stated that financing an SGEI is not State 
aid if it is meant to fund a well-identified task, if the financing conditions have been 
defined in a clear and transparent way, ensuring that it does not exceed the costs of 
the SGEI, and if the service is provided in a cost-efficient manner.
2 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/sgei_archive_en.html
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• The ‘Almunia package’ contributed to clarifying basic concepts of SGEI 
as well as their funding in terms of ‘public service compensation’ and 
related rules, e.g that State aid for social services does not need to 
be notified if defined compatibility conditions apply. This package also 
included a new ‘de minimis regulation’ concerning state aid stipulating 
that SGEI compensation which amounts to less than €500,000 per un-
dertaking over three fiscal years does not fall under State aid scrutiny, 
i.e. all funding of social services entrusted to any provider below the 
threshold will comply with EU State aid rules.
• Furthermore, a proposal of the Commission for new and simpler pub-
lic procurement rules3
 
is driven by the idea that Member States should 
enjoy a wide margin of discretion in the organisation of social services 
and the choice of providers, considering the importance of the cul-
tural context and the sensitivity of social service provision. Therefore, 
public procurement rules for social services would only apply above a 
threshold of €500,000: ‘Contracts below this threshold are presumed 
not to be of interest for providers based in other Member States un-
less there are concrete indications of the contrary. This implies that, below 
this threshold, in the absence of cross-border interest, the Directive 
would not apply. Nor would the Treaty principles, such as the trans-
parency requirement and the obligation to treat economic operators 
equally without discrimination’ (European Commission, 2013b: 22; 
italics by the author).
In spite of these simplifications, clarifications and improved guidance 
(European Commission, 2013c) there remain a number of open questions 
not only in individual Member States, but in particular in relation to the 
practice of public procurement and state aid concerning cross-border 
issues:
• How is the ‘cultural context and the sensitivity of social service provi-
sion’ interpreted in the practice of cross-border relationships, e.g. 
between countries with the same language and cultural background?
• What do ‘transparency’ and ‘discrimination of economic operators’ 
mean for providers of social services operating across borders, e.g. in 
managing care homes for older people?
• How do stakeholders experience the European and the different 
national regulatory framework conditions when operating care homes 
in two neighbouring countries?
This Policy Brief therefore reports on an inquiry about experiences of 
German care home providers to move (or not to move) their activities 
3 see http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/modernising_rules/
reform_proposals_en.htm
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to Austria – a neighbouring country, where the same language is spoken 
and where a similar welfare regime can be found. It thus could be as-
sumed that the ‘cultural context’ would play a marginal role and that 
there would be ample interest of German providers to enter the Aus-
trian ‘care market’. Particularly over the past decade the Austrian LTC 
sector has been significantly modernised and expanded. It thus offers 
opportunities for German organisations with the intention to grow also 
across national borders. Such intentions, one would further expect, would 
be facilitated by the EU internal market regulations that aim at remov-
ing protective national measures. Finally, it could be assumed that fierce 
competition and extensive regulations on quality assurance and public re-
porting in the German care home market represent an incentive to move 
to Austria where the regulatory framework is less strict and does not 
stipulate public reporting on quality. Surprisingly, however, only a handful 
of German provider organisations have thus far invested in, constructed 
or taken over care homes in Austria (see References: websites). And 
there are no Austrian groups at all that have moved to Germany. 
To find out more about the reasons for this counterintuitive observa-
tion, an explorative study was carried out in the context of the EU FP7 
project ‘Evaluating Care Across Borders’ (ECAB, Project No. 242058). As 
there is no specific literature about cross-border activities in LTC provi-
sion this study (Leichsenring et al., 2013) tried for the first time to find 
out more about the motivations, the experiences and the perspectives 
of relevant stakeholders by means of interviews with representatives of 
German holdings and their Austrian affiliations. Furthermore, Austrian 
public officials were contacted in those regions where German provid-
ers had been identified. The interviews were prepared by searching for 
relevant interview-partners via expert contacts and the Internet, and by a 
guideline for semi-structured interviews.
Differences and commonalities in regula-
tory frameworks related to long-term care 
Austria and Germany, though both federal states with constitutionally de-
fined responsibilities of regional (state) governments for LTC, stroke two 
distinct paths in the governance of LTC services during the 1990s. The 
introduction of the German LTC Insurance (1995/96) established open 
market access for all LTC providers that complied with defined accredita-
tion rules, while beneficiaries gained additional purchasing power (in cash 
or in kind) that allowed for greater choice between providers and types 
of support. Prices (daily rates) were henceforth negotiated between 
provider federations and regional branches of the LTC Insurance, while 
residents pay fees from their income and LTC benefits.
The exploratory study in  
the context of the EU FP7  
project ‘Evaluating Care 
Across Borders’ (ECAB) was 
based on three interviews 
with relevant stakeholders  
in Austria.
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Before 1995, services and care homes in Germany had been provided 
mainly by non-profit and public providers. The extension of the market 
was accompanied by the emergence of new and additional private for-
profit providers (Evers, 2011; Heinze et al., 2011) as well as new contrac-
tual agreements and extended regulations on standards and principles 
for quality and quality assurance. These include routine external qual-
ity inspections conducted by the Medical Board of the Health Insurers 
(MDK), the establishment of internal quality management systems and 
enhanced transparency of quality, e.g. by ‘transparency criteria’ that are 
assessed during inspections and made publicly available on a dedicated 
website (see Table 1). This triggered an ample discussion about quality and 
eventually increased the professionalisation in this sector. 
The comprehensive, tax-funded Austrian LTC allowance scheme was 
introduced in 1993 with an indirect impact on the governance of social 
services. As the scheme blurred the traditional subsidiarity principle, 
it required a treaty between the regions and the federal state to alter 
constitutional inconsistencies – while LTC allowances were from then on 
financed from the federal budget, regional governments were required to 
ensure the quantitative and qualitative development of services based on 
‘Regional Needs and Development Plans’. Compared to Germany, it took 
some more years till the increased purchasing power of beneficiaries and 
the activation of regional governments in terms of social planning con-
tributed to a constantly growing ‘care market’, including a rising number 
of care homes managed by private for-profit providers. However, the 
regulatory framework remained characterised by social planning, rather 
than by market-oriented reforms. This approach included a rather hesi-
tant advance of quality assurance mechanisms, resulting only recently in 
the introduction of a voluntary ‘National Quality Certificate’. Still, inspec-
tion and related enforcement measures remained undisclosed and at the 
discretion of regional governments (table 1).
In particular the differences concerning internal quality management, 
intensive (yearly) inspection and the public reporting of quality put 
considerable burden upon management and staff in German care homes. 
However, this does not seem to trigger cross-border movement as, in 
general, management seems to be highly interested in quality manage-
ment. This general interest has been expressed by ‘bottom-up’ initiatives 
and the voluntary introduction of quality management in Austria. 
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Category Austria Germany
Market access Authorisation according to re-
gional ‘needs and Development 
plans’ (and good relations to lo-
cal and regional administrations)
Establishing a ‘provision contract’ 
with the regulators (Region and 
regional branches of the LTC 
insurance)
Funding Reimbursement of the provider 
per place on a defined flat-rate 
basis by the regional government 
which, in turn, will invoice the 
resident (out-of-pocket contri-
bution from pension and ltC 
allowance, excluding ‘pocket-
money’); subsidies for up to 40% 
of construction costs
Individual negotiations with 
regional/local LTC Insurance 
branches to establish daily rates, 
specific staffing rules etc.
Individual contract with each 
resident who pays directly to 
the care home according to care 
needs, use of nursing aids etc.
Quality criteria Regional care home Acts (staffing, 
care quality, hygiene, structural 
criteria); Gesundheits- und  
Krankenpflege-Gesetz (act on 
health and nursing care); internal 
quality management (voluntary)
Guidelines of the Medical Board 
of the LTC Insurances (MDK); 
Agreement on transparency 
(“Transparenzvereinbarung”); 
internal quality management 
(compulsory)
Inspection Carinthia: Once a year 0.5-1 day, 
short report with recommenda-
tions
 
Vorarlberg: on demand and every 
3 years by a commission that 
is nominated by the county ad-
ministration (Bezirksverwaltung), 
consisting of a medical doctor, a 
nursing expert and an adminis-
trative officer
Since 2011: once a year (1-2 





Carinthia: no compulsory quality 
management; yearly inspection 
of compliance with regional care 
home Act (structural require-
ments, staffing levels, hygiene, 
care quality); no public reporting
 
Vorarlberg: no compulsory quality 
management; no public reporting
 
National level: Voluntary adher-
ence to National Quality Cer-
tificate (NQZ), an external audit 
of accredited internal quality 
management systems (E-Qalin, 
ISO9000ff., QAP+)
Compulsory quality management
Since 2011: yearly (not an-
nounced) inspections according 
to the MDK guidelines and public 
reporting (website) of ratings
Table 1: 
Comparing austrian and 
German regulatory frame-
works in long-term care
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Strategies and experiences in cross-border  
movement of care home providers 
This section will shed some light on the motivations, obstacles and ex-
planations for tangible experiences in cross-border movements between 
Germany and Austria based on exploratory interviews with two Ger-
man care home providers (St. Anna Hilfe and ProCurand) and one austrian 
public official.
Market access by personal relationships 
Back in 1998 the three public care homes run by the local government 
of Bregenz got into economic and management troubles. As a result of a 
personal connection with the Mayor the German ‘Stiftung Liebenau’ was 
therefore invited to bring in its know-how and take over the city’s public 
care homes. The new management consolidated the situation, carried out 
some investments and thus got access to the previously ‘closed’ Austrian 
market. Today, ‘St. Anna Hilfe gGmbH’4
 
provides 11 care homes for older 
people in three Austrian regions (Vorarlberg, Upper Austria, Vienna) 
although the expansion to Austria had originally not been a strategic 
goal of ‘Stiftung Liebenau’. However, the geographical vicinity and personal 
relationships were at the origin of what was perceived as a new challenge 
by the foundation’s board of directors.
This entry via personal relationships with local or regional politicians or 
other important stakeholders shows a remarkable pattern of market-
entry that seems to persist across Austria. In general, access is regulated 
by political and administrative gate-keepers, namely regional ‘Needs and 
Development Plans’, rather than by open market access as in Germany. 
However, even if new residential structures would be necessary accord-
ing to these plans, public tendering for care homes remains an almost 
unknown procedure in Austria. It is therefore not surprising that also 
ProCurand, a group that provides more than 2,500 places in care homes 
and service housing in 20 German cities, had entered the Austrian market 
via personal relationships. In this case, the care home ‘Julienhöhe’ had been 
a client of the German ProCurand consultancy. This resulted in a manage-
ment take-over in 2005 with the intention to further expand the group’s 
activities in Austria. The following section might explain why this strategy 
was not followed-up and why also the expansion strategy of St. Anna Hilfe 
came to a halt after several years.
4 The ‘gemeinnützige GmbH’ is a specific type of a limited liability company (‘non-profit 
Ltd.’) by Austrian and German law, which stipulates specific tax advantages if the orga-
nisation produces goods or services of ‘common welfare’ and re-invests any profit in 
related activities.
Personal relationships seem 
to be the only lever to 
overcome restrictive access 
mechanisms for new care 
home providers in Austria.
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Regional strategies to close the market?
Once in the market, St. Anna Hilfe had quickly been able to consolidate 
the performance of those care homes they had taken over – with the 
given cost structures and daily rates paid through the existing regula-
tions “the opportunities for us were prodigious” (K.M., CEO St. Anna Hilfe). 
From the perspective of the public administration and other local stake-
holders, the market-entry of St. Anna Hilfe and their ensuing expansion 
were accompanied by other developments that intrigued the situation 
in the regional LTC market. The advancement of independent providers 
triggered the ‘Federation of Municipalities in Vorarlberg’ to found its own 
enterprise (Benevit gGmbH) to manage care homes in municipalities that 
intended to outsource: “This strategy … was definitely motivated by so-
cial policy strategies as a response to the aggressive acquisition strategy 
of private providers” (P.H., Regional Government of Vorarlberg). The turmoil 
in the regional care market eventually resulted in new legal regulations, 
namely the 2002 Care Home Act for Vorarlberg with the concurrent 
definition of fixed prices according to residents’ care levels. All providers 
(public or private) may since only invoice these defined prices, currently 
for instance an all-inclusive daily rate of €164 (excl. VAT) for a resident 
with heavy care needs.
Economic challenges 
The Care Home Act also stipulated that the establishment of care homes 
in Vorarlberg is based on a notification proceeding, rather than on an 
authorisation procedure: “As a consequence, to date, we have no legal 
means to enjoin anyone from constructing a care home, even if it would 
not comply with our regional ‘Needs and Development Plan’ (…) Any 
organisation or individual may invest into, construct and run a care home 
in Vorarlberg. Residents in such a care home would be supported as 
individual residents, provided that the care home management presents 
a structural and economic concept and adheres to the regional quality 
requirements” (P.H., Regional Government of Vorarlberg).
However, the actual feasibility to construct and manage a care home is 
another pair of shoes. New investors would not be eligible to the re-
gional subsidy of 40% on investments if they were not complying with 
the ‘Needs and Developmental Plan’. In addition, they would have to face 
high construction costs, high ecology standards and relatively important 
structural standards prescribed by the regional government, e.g. only 
single rooms with at least 25 m2 are allowed. As a consequence, over the 
past few years no provider has succeeded to construct care homes in 
Vorarlberg below about €150,000 per place. This amount is far above 
what investors are used to in Germany, where the construction costs are 
calculated with €60,000 to €80,000 per place in a care home.
While the legal framework 
would allow anybody to build 
a care home, the economic 
feasibility is another pair of 
shoes.
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An important difference between managing a care home in Germany and 
in Austria is that, in Austrian care homes, there are only a maximum of 
10% of all residents who pay for all services out-of-pocket, while the vast 
majority’s costs are co-funded by the regional government, which acts 
as a purchaser.5
 
In Germany, each individual can be charged according to 
the services provided – with individual costs, for instance, for auxiliary 
material that, in Austria, is reimbursed directly by the health insurance. As 
a result, “in economic terms it is a different challenge in Austria (…) for 
instance, staff costs are higher in Austria also due to higher wage brackets 
(…) while in relation to staffing requirements we’re better off in Austria” 
(F.B., care home manager ‘Julienhöhe’). 
Still, all in all it could be economically attractive for German providers to 
extend their activities to Austria as many risks are minimised. Further-
more, there is “more money in the system” (K.M., CEO St. Anna Hilfe). for 
instance, tariffs are 20% higher in Vorarlberg than in Germany, with less 
defined staffing standards and almost no competition – occupancy rates 
are quite stable above 95%. These framework conditions are the same for 
all providers. German companies do not have any advantages. Given the 
difficulties in getting access the major economic challenge is therefore to 
manage without being able to take advantage of economies of scale. From 
a public authority’s perspective it is important that no huge profits can 
be made in the context of Austrian SSGI: “In spite of the defined prices, 
a holding company with several care homes may be able to make some 
small profits, in particular by their usual practice to charge a ‘management 
fee’ of about 4 per cent of their turnover to finance overhead costs” 
(P.H., Regional Government of Vorarlberg).
Regulatory frameworks call for adaptation
Once having settled in Austria, German provider organisations have 
experienced advantages and inconveniences at several levels concerning 
the legal and regulatory framework (Table 1). Without prior experiences 
in foreign countries, the transfer of German know-how turned out to 
be a major challenge for ProCurand. For instance, the care management 
software including care documentation could not be simply transferred 
to Austria where the ‘Health and Nursing Care Act’ (Gesundheits- und 
Krankenpflege-Gesetz) requires care planning which, for instance, is 
not included in the software as it is not necessary in Germany. Another 
5 Residents who want to benefit from support by the regional social assistance, as they 
would not be able to pay for – in this case – about €5,000 per month, have to declare 
their income situation (including LTC allowance and assets) and contribute with their 
pension (excluded 20% pocket-money and 13th and 14th pension payments) and the 
LTC allowance (excluded €44.29 per month). For all residents who are not able to 
pay for full costs the public administration reimburses the care home directly.
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“shock consisted in realising that in Austria there is a clearly defined col-
lective agreement for care staff which stipulates regular pay rise and 14 
wages per year, rather than yearly negotiations and twelve wages per year 
[as in Germany]. Working conditions and social security regulations are 
simply more generous in Austria” (F.B., care home manager ‘Julienhöhe’). 
Cultural and professional differences
Although Austria and Germany seem to be ‘united’ by their common 
language, cultural differences between the two countries are manifold. In 
particular, the diversity in political cultures was striking for German man-
agers moving to Austria. In the beginning, both in Carinthia and Vorarlberg 
German managers were confronted with mistrust and reservation. This 
may sometimes even have economic consequences when, for instance, 
the then German care home manager was not informed about specific 
subsidies granted during that period (2005-2006) by the Carinthian 
government: “It makes a difference whether I have to pay normal interest 
rates of 4 per cent or loans with generous terms of 0.5 per cent subsi-
dised by the regional administration” (F.B., care home manager ‘Julienhöhe’). 
The German management of Austrian care homes also attracted a 
number of German care professionals. Also in this case, some cultural 
differences had to be overcome: “The German colleagues working here in 
Carinthia got an excellent education and training, but they got a differ-
ent culture. (…) People here do not understand why suddenly someone 
talks to them in plain German” (F.B., care home manager ‘Julienhöhe’). in 
general, however, integrating German nurses is quite straightforward as 
qualifications are comparable and similar. This is more complex for Ger-
man ‘geriatric nurses’ (‘Altenpfleger’) as this job profile does not exist in 
Austria. They are therefore employed in Austria as ‘nursing auxiliaries’ 
or under the new job profile ‘specialised social carer in work with older 
people’, which implies both a hierarchical and a financial downgrading 
(see Winkelmann, 2013).
Less quality assurance, inspection ‘light’ –  
and no public reporting
In the light of experiences made with public reporting in Germany, 
Stiftung Liebenau and St. Anna Hilfe had the advantage of being better 
prepared for external inspection and quality development. However, the 
external audit by the Medical Board of the Health Insurances (MDK) 
in Germany is much debated and managers are not convinced that it 
helps to provide real transparency – “What is inspected [in Germany] is 
your ability to deal with medical or nursing care and to document your 
procedures, rather than measuring quality of life and whether the right 
Kai Leichsenring • far from a Common markEt
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songs are being sung with the residents” (K.M., CEO St. Anna Hilfe). still, 
knowledge about risk management, the development of indicators and 
respective exchange with the German colleagues from Stiftung Liebenau 
have certainly created a competitive advantage for St. Anna care homes. 
The Austrian care home manager of ProCurand’s ‘Julienhöhe’ has ex-
changed experiences concerning the German inspection system with 
German colleagues: “they complain a lot about the amount of time that 
is spent with documentation and inspection”. This is in stark contrast to 
the Austrian practice, where inspectors check mainly structural criteria 
with internal guidelines, but do not publish their results. In Carinthia, 
inspection takes place once a year: “Inspection procedures in Austria 
have a more ‘human touch’ (…) one or two inspectors will visit for half 
a day and provide a report of two or three pages that you can discuss 
with them on the basis of mutual understanding” (F.B., care home manager 
‘Julienhöhe’). Similar perceptions have been made in Vorarlberg, where the 
regional authorities once invited two colleagues from the German MDK 
to check two of their care homes according to the German criteria and 
inspection procedures: “Their approach to assess processes and results is 
certainly more profound than our inspection, but in the end the inspec-
tion result is comparable: our care home above average was assessed 
above average also by the MDK, the other (small, old and very traditional) 
care home was assessed non-compliant due to the lack of documentation 
and the lack of up-to-date care processes” (P.H., Regional Government of 
Vorarlberg).
However, the less laborious quality assurance procedures are not per-
ceived as an incentive for german providers to move to austria because 
“any investor will first of all look at his return on investment – and in the 
area of care homes the return on investment is not such to impress any 
private investor (…) The profit margins are quite small and, in particular, 
the instruments to influence these margins are very limited – staffing re-
quirements are defined, staff has to be paid according to collective agree-
ments, building regulations have to be followed” (P.H., Regional Government 
of Vorarlberg).
The future of competition under Austrian  
‘market’ conditions
It is quite obvious not only for German providers of care homes in 
Austria that more transparency and quality development will be needed 
to keep care homes ‘in the market’ as an alternative to home care and 
other types of assistance: “However, as almost all our places are pur-
chased by the regional government, we have to accept all residents they 
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EU regulations are interpret-
ed in different ways across 
Member States, based on 
national policies and path-
ways that might block cross-
border provision.
 
are allocating to us. This means that it does not make sense to undertake 
any advertising activity” (F.B., care home manager ‘Julienhöhe’). The German 
proprietary company is therefore also hesitant to invest in the introduc-
tion of a quality management system, which would be a precondition to 
apply for the recently introduced voluntary National Quality Certificate 
(NQZ) that is based on an external audit (BMASK, 2012). It is doubtful 
whether it would represent a competitive advantage as competition in 
Austria is characterised by different parameters than in Germany: “We 
are facing an increasingly fierce competition: new care homes have been 
constructed with important subsidies in the local vicinity, the regional 
government is subsidising community care services and there are national 
subsidies for 24-hour care [provided by live-in carers from neighbouring 
low-wage countries]. (…) All this results in the unprecedented situation 
for Carinthia that we have empty beds in care homes” (F.B., care home 
manager ‘Julienhöhe’).6
In general, competition based on quality and performance is scarcely 
developed across Austria, and for the public administration it remains 
doubtful whether more competition would be able to improve quality 
in LTC. Competition is likely to remain restricted to local markets and 
other types of providers, but there will be an increasing challenge in some 
areas with a high density of care homes and in regions where providers 
are competing for well-educated staff.
No plaintiff, no judge: Is the Austrian  
reality at odds with EU regulations? 
The outlined difficulties in terms of access, economic challenges and cul-
tural differences explain quite impressively why German providers do not 
expand their activities across the German-Austrian border. The ‘market’ 
is open only in theoretical terms. In the light of EU regulations about the 
internal market this situation sounds at odds with the guarantee of free 
movement of goods, capital, services and people (cf. van de gronden, 
2013). In the context of debates about SSGI7 Austrian and other na-
tional administrations have argued, however, that this sector needs to be 
regulated differently, and ‘competitive tendering’ would not be obligatory 
for care homes: “(…) the main argument of the regional government of 
Vorarlberg – and actually of all Austrian regulators – for not establishing 
tendering procedures in the area of social care (…) consists in stating 
6 Indeed, the care home ‘Julienhöhe’ had to declare bankruptcy during the first months 
of 2013. The care home is still operational, negotiations about the continuation by a 
rescue company are ongoing. 
7 http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=794&langId=en; see also debates and 
comments at www.deutscher-verein.de
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that it is not the care home that is subsidised, but the individual resident 
who is cared for (…) We are not purchasing 50 places in a care home, 
but we are supporting individual residents to get the care they need 
within this facility” (P.H., Regional Government of Vorarlberg).
A different perspective is taken when a municipality decides to build 
a new care home as a public building promoter based on the regional 
‘Needs and Development Plan’. In this case, even under the new EU de 
minimis rule it will in most cases be compulsory to publish a call for ten-
der, but specific types of ‘public-private-partnerships’ have surfaced here, 
too. Over the past few years, for instance, a private Austrian non-profit 
Ltd. that is both constructing and managing care homes has cooperated 
on several occasions with municipalities to build care homes according to 
the regional ‘Needs and Development Plan’. They were therefore entitled 
to a subsidy of 40 per cent of the construction costs. However, no public 
tender was published based on the argument that only less than 40 per 
cent of the total investments were funded by State aid.
In spite of this fragile legal situation it is interesting to note that EU 
regulations have not really influenced regional policies in this sector over 
the past few years, apart from public tendering for architectural plan-
ning and construction of care homes: “Still, if a public tender for building 
a care home is published, it is usually already known who will then run 
the facility in order to ensure that the future provider’s concept can be 
realised” (P.H., Regional Government of Vorarlberg). for german providers, 
this situation is unfamiliar: “(They) would like to invest and/or to increase 
their activities in Austria, but they are blocked by the strict regulation of 
access” (K.M., CEO St. Anna Hilfe). 
Taking the latest developments in EU regulations into account, these tend 
to adapt to the reality of national and regional strategies concerning the 
governance of SSGI. For German or other foreign provider organisations 
that would like to invest in Austria, additional efforts would be necessary 
to change the situation of the ‘closed market’. Related recommendations 
would comprise the following issues:
• To foster more ‘objective’ market access procedures by means of 
compulsory public tendering procedures: “Investing into a care home 
today, usually implies a financial plan – and risk – covering a period 
of 30-40 years, so policy-makers are well advised to look for a very 
trustworthy provider and/or manager of such an undertaking, i.e. one 
who is able to guarantee a decent organisation over a long period of 
time.” (K.M., CEO St. Anna gGmbH).
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• To provide more transparency by facilitating a level playground and 
ensuring equal opportunities in a competitive environment: “This 
means equal access to information and subsidies, equal preconditions 
and quality control and equal payment of staff. As we are talking about 
public money, it would be important to ensure that nobody takes 
advantage of, for instance, paying lower wages and bagging the profits” 
(F.B., care home manager ‘Julienhöhe’).
• To monitor the rise of ‘sale and lease back’ practices that have recent-
ly also been introduced in Austria. 
• To balance internal market rules and local needs and characteristics: 
“It would be appalling if we had, for instance, providers from abroad 
bringing their own staff … perhaps even being paid according to their 
national regulations (…) in care there are some general standards, but 
this is useless if I do not understand the mentality of residents” (F.B., 
care home manager ‘Julienhöhe’).
Conclusions 
This Policy Brief has shown that the restricted market access in Austria 
has prevented German providers from expanding their activities there, 
even though the economic framework conditions and the geographic 
vicinity would represent positive incentives. The specific interpretation of 
internal market rules by Austrian regulators will certainly be subject to 
further debates in the future. But as of today Austria remains a de facto 
‘closed shop’ for foreign investors due to its specific political economy 
and governance of social service planning and delivery. The common 
language and the cultural vicinity between Austria and Germany would 
suggest that it should be easier to run a business in both countries, but 
evidence has shown that regulatory differences in LTC legislations and 
idiosyncrasies of the political culture and practice in Austria require im-
portant efforts of adaptation even in this case of cross-border activities.
At first sight, the heavily regulated access to the ‘care market’ in Austria 
seems at odds with general rules of the internal market and other EU 
regulations. However, the virtual closure of the Austrian LTC market is 
not based on the explicit legal or formal exclusion of additional, foreign 
providers but on administrative practices and implicit procedures. So the 
situation is comparable to other Member States, where similar mecha-
nisms are applied, and has not yet triggered any legal action. This is likely 
to be due to the generally low level of ‘potential profitability’ in the area 
of LTC under existing framework conditions, rather than to the lower 
level of quality regulations and the lack of public reporting mechanisms in 
austria.
The fragile legal situation of 
SSGI warrants further de-
bates about national strate-
gies, transparency and the 
role of market mechanisms  
in this sector.
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This Policy Brief has shown that with respect to both cross-border activi-
ties and public reporting on quality a range of political and regulatory 
dilemmas remain to be addressed. First, basic EU principles that underpin 
the common market continue to compete with national, regional and 
local characteristics, the interests of relevant stakeholders and citizens’ 
expectations when it comes to the delivery of SSGI. Recent adaptations 
have certainly contributed to some clarification and simplification, but 
national pathways and welfare traditions and different ways to introduce 
New Public Management methods have contributed to further differ-
entiation of regulatory frameworks. In Germany the open market was 
installed together with a series of measures to compensate for potential 
market failures (definition of quality criteria, compulsory quality manage-
ment, intensified inspection, public reporting). Austria opted for a slightly 
different path. Given the peculiarity of the Austrian welfare mix, there 
are mainly public or non-profit organisations that deliver SSGI; the lat-
ter with a long tradition and affiliations to either the political parties or 
the churches. Their relations to the public authorities remain based on 
mutual trust and personal relationships, while contractual relationships 
have only slowly developed. All relevant stakeholders continue to develop 
strategies to keep the area of SSGI under control. For instance, they set 
up outsourced public enterprises or sustain that public tendering of care 
homes was not necessary for it is the individual resident who is subsi-
dised, rather than the provider organisation.
Second, the difficulties to define and monitor quality standards in LTC 
beyond basic structural criteria continue to trigger various national ap-
proaches to quality assurance and regulations related to the information 
of (potential) clients and residents. While all Member States struggle with 
the definition of result-oriented quality standards in LTC (Hoffmann and 
Leichsenring, 2011; European Centre, 2010), also in this area national 
characteristics and approaches play an important role. For instance, the 
German LTC sector is regulated by the ‘Medical Board of the Health 
Insurances’, which defines quality of care from a sturdily medical per-
spective. This is in stark contrast to the much less regulated and hardly 
systematic inspection approach of regional regulators in Austria. Fur-
thermore, in Austria the collocation of responsibilities for the definition 
of quality criteria and funding at one and the same level of government 
(regions) is boosting the genuine conflict between quality and costs – 
with the exception of some enlightened public officials and managers, any 
investment in quality improvement is perceived as an additional factor to 
impact on prices and hence public expenditure.
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Third, these unresolved challenges also hamper real competition based 
on price and quality between different providers within and between na-
tional quasi-markets. Various factors within and between regions (capped 
prices, local wage-levels, various staffing levels etc.) determine whether 
individual organisations, once having got access, will be able to perform 
‘better’ than others. Even the German system of public reporting is highly 
contested, and not only by provider organisations (Hasseler and Wolf-
Ostermann, 2010). Nor is it able to specify a correlation between quality 
and prices. Also the Austrian approach with a voluntary ‘National Quality 
Certificate’ will hardly be able to do so. However, we have learned that 
such regulations will not be a feature neither to attract nor to further 
detain foreign provider organisations to move their activities across 
borders.
This situation calls for further endeavours on various political levels of 
governance also under the ‘light regime for social services’ in relation 
to State aid and public procurement of SSGI. In fact, more transparency 
is necessary beyond current reports on the state of SSGI (Huber et al., 
2008; Polacek et al., 2011). This includes quality reporting and further 
elaboration of indicators used at national and regional levels with the 
aim to share methods and systemic incentives for quality development in 
the context of regional idiosyncrasies. In terms of social investment, this 
implies to improve working conditions and training of staff, also across 
borders and by integrating migrant care staff, to learn from each other 
and to attract workforce to the sector of LTC. Finally, the governance of 
quasi-markets needs further improvement by striking a balance between 
over- and under-regulation. The challenges include issues such as the 
avoidance of overcapacities, bankruptcies and related care home closures 
in the context of a mixed economy of care with private non-profit, com-
mercial and public providers – also across European borders.
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